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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
PEE DEE HEALTHCARE, P.A. V. SANFORD: RURAL 
HEAL TH CARE PROVIDERS HAVE A RIGHT TO ENFORCE 
MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAMS BY SUING 
STATE OFFICIALS PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
By: Michael Gillman 
In an issue of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit held that rural healthcare providers serving 
Medicaid recipients had a right under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 ("§ 1983") to 
sue state officials to enforce rights granted to them under the Medicaid 
reimbursement program. Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford, 509 
F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2007). More specifically, the Court found that a 
rural healthcare provider is entitled to sue under § 1983 to obtain 
reimbursement in accordance with federal Medicaid statutes. Sanford, 
509 F.3d at 211-12. 
Pee Dee Healthcare, P.A. ("Pee Dee") is a healthcare provider 
serving low-income patients in rural areas of South Carolina. Pee Dee 
is qualified to provide these services under the federal Medicaid 
Program. Medicaid service providers, like Pee Dee, are entitled to 
receive reimbursement payments from the state. Eligibility for 
reimbursement requires health care providers to enter into contracts 
with the agency responsible for the administration of the Medicaid 
Program, in this case, the South Carolina Department of Health and 
Human Services ("SCDHHS"). This contract must contain a forum-
selection clause that provides that all reimbursement claims must be 
pursued through state judicial and administrative avenues. The 
reimbursement provisions under the Medicaid program are located in 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb) ("§ 1396a(bb)"). Pee Dee claimed that the 
state of South Carolina used a formula which was not consistent with 
the formula in § 1396a(bb), thus violating its right to proper 
reimbursement. 
Pee Dee first brought its claim in South Carolina state court against 
the Governor of South Carolina, the Director of SCDHHS and 
SCDHHS itself. The case was then removed to the United States 
District Court for the District of South Carolina. Pee Dee then 
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amended its complaint to include a federal cause of action pursuant to 
§ 1983. The district court dismissed Pee Dee's claim, noting that 
venue was inappropriate based on the forum-selection clause in the 
contract between Pee Dee and SCDHHS. Pee Dee appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which reviewed 
de novo the district court's dismissal based on the forum-selection 
clause. 
The Court first examined the language of § 1983 in order to 
determine if Pee Dee had a right to bring a private action under that 
statute. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210. Section 1983 imposes a liability on 
one who, under the color of state law, deprives any person of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution or laws. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 209-10. A plaintiff 
alleging a violation of a federal statue cannot sue under § 1983 if the 
statute does not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities 
which fall within the meaning of the section or if Congress has 
explicitly prohibited such enforcement within the statute itself. 
Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210. The Court then identified a test ("Blessing 
Test") articulated in Blessing v. Freestone to determine whether a 
statute creates an enforceable right. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210 (citing 
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997)). In the first part of the 
test, the Court looks at Congress' intent to ensure that the provision 
benefits the plaintiff. Id. at 210. In the second part of the test, the 
Court looks to see that the right protected was not too vague. Id. 
Finally, the Court looks at the statute to see if it imposed a binding 
obligation on the state. Id. The Court declared that its greatest task 
when performing this analysis was to ensure that the statute has 
"rights-creating language" and that it is not phrased in terms of general 
policy or practice, but rather in terms of the persons who are benefited 
by that right. Id. (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)). 
The Court first considered its decisions prior to its current 
enactment of the Medicaid statute. Id. at 210. In Va. Hosp. Ass'n v. 
Baliles, the Court held that a healthcare provider had a right under § 
1983 to challenge a method of reimbursement for healthcare providers 
participating in Medicaid programs. Sanford, 509 F .3d at 21 0 (citing 
Va. Hosp. Ass'n v. Ealiles, 868 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1989)). In Baliles, 
the Court reasoned that the intent and legislative history of the act was 
to allow health care providers a right of action against the state when 
they felt they were not compensated according to Medicaid 
requirements. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210. The Court then identified 
another recent decision, Doe v. Kidd, which dealt with another 
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Medicaid waiver program. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210-11 (citing Doe v. 
Kidd, 501 F.3d 348 (4th. Cir. 2007». In that instance, the Fourth 
Circuit allowed a health care provider to pursue a claim using § 1983. 
Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210. However, in Doe, the Court found a right of 
action under § 1983 only while interpreting a specific portion of § 
1396. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210-11. Pee Dee urged the Court to 
consider for the first time whether § 1396, read as a whole, created the 
rights necessary to be actionable under § 1983. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 
211. 
The Court looked at the plain language of each individual sub-
section of § 1396a(bb). Sanford, 509 F.3d at 211. The Court 
acknowledged that §§ 1396a(bb)(l)-(bb)(4) repeat the phrase that "a 
state plan shall provide for payment for services." Sanford, 509 F.3d 
at 211 (emphasis in original). The Court also looked at the language 
of 1396a(bb)(6)(B), which provided that an alternative payment 
methodology must be at least equal to the amount required by the 
section. Sanford, 509 F .3d at 211. 
The Court then applied the Blessing Test to detennine if this 
section as a whole created an enforceable right. Sanford, 509 F .3d at 
212. The Court began by examining the language in § 1396a(bb)(l), 
requiring a state's plan to provide for payment of services provided by 
rural health care clinics. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 212. The Court 
reasoned that this language indicated Congress' intent for the statute to 
benefit rural health care providers such as Pee Dee. Id. Next, the 
Court decided that the phrase "shall provide payment" is judicially 
enforceable because it is not amorphous or unduly vague. Id. In 
addition, the Court noted that the provision clearly required states to 
reimburse rural health care providers such as Pee Dee for services 
provided to Medicaid patients. Id. Lastly, the Court viewed the 
repeated use of "shall" as unambiguously binding the states. Id. 
Finally, the Court determined, that the statute contained "rights-
creating language" and that the statute was not phrased in general 
terms, but rather phrased in tenns of the persons who are benefited by 
that right. Id. (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273). The Court determined 
that the language in § 1396a(bb) contained "rights creating language" 
because it specifically designated the Rural Healthcare Providers as 
beneficiaries. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 212 (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 
273). The Court also noted that the language mandated action on the 
part of the states. Id. at 212. The Court then recognized that § 
1396a(bb) did not have an aggregate focus, but rather a very 
individualized focus. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 212. In light of these 
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factors, the Court recognized that the language of § 1396a(bb) created 
an enforceable right under § 1983. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 212. 
The Court shows a willingness to interpret a statute, such as § 
1396a(bb), broadly. Maryland, much like South Carolina, also has 
rural healthcare providers that serve Medicaid recipients. This 
decision is important because it shows clinics and providers that they 
have an additional avenue of redress should the state deprive them of 
their statutorily defined compensation. In addition, this decision will 
put Maryland and other states on notice that should they attempt to 
deprive clinics of their statutory right to proper payment, there is 
another manner by which clinics and providers may obtain adequate 
compensation. 
